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Abstract
This article provides an ethical analysis of psychedelic research involving disorders of consciousness patients. We apply
two internationally accepted approaches for analyzing the ethics of human research, the Value-Validity Framework and
Component Analysis, to a research program recently proposed by Scott and Carhart-Harris. We focus on Scott and Carhart-
Harris’s proposal, but the ethical frameworks outlined are applicable to other novel research protocols in the science of
consciousness.
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A man goes to knowledge as he goes to war: wide-awake, with fear,
with respect, and with absolute assurance. Going to knowledge or going
to war in any other manner is a mistake.
Carlos Castaneda
The Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui Way of Knowledge
Introduction
Scott and Carhart-Harris (2019) recently proposed the investiga-
tional administration of the natural serotonergic psychedelic,
psilocybin, to disorders of consciousness (DoC) patients. Their
research program outlines healthy participant trials to investi-
gate psilocybin’s capacity to modulate consciousness. These
experiments involve psilocybin administration while healthy
participants are under sedation or in non-REM sleep (Scott and
Carhart-Harris 2019, 5–6). Once efficacy and safety are estab-
lished, they propose an adaptive trial involving DoC patients.
Neuroimaging and electrophysiological (EEG) studies—either
alone or in combination with transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS)—demonstrate a strong association between brain com-
plexity and the preservation of consciousness (Casali et al. 2013;
Sitt et al. 2014). At least one study has shown an increase in
brain complexity associated with psilocybin administration in
healthy participants (Schartner et al. 2017). Scott and Carhart-
Harris reason that the administration of psilocybin to DoC
patients might also increase brain complexity and hasten recov-
ery. This would place psilocybin among a limited range of
“awakening drugs” for DoC patients, such as Amantadine and
Zolpidem, that complement other rehabilitation efforts in this
population (Giacino et al. 2012; Thonnard et al. 2013).
We applaud Scott and Carhart-Harris for seeking out innova-
tive therapies for DoC patients. Treatment of DoC patients is
challenging, and the development of new, cost-effective thera-
pies could revolutionize clinical care and rehabilitation.
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Nevertheless, caution must be taken when involving this popu-
lation in clinical research. Scott and Carhart-Harris justify their
proposal by arguing that it is “ethically proportionate” where
proportionate is understood as an adequate balance of the risks
and benefits of research (Scott and Carhart-Harris 2019, 4). This
intuition is correct, but the generality of this claim obscures sev-
eral complex issues that are relevant to a rigorous ethical analy-
sis of psychedelic research involving DoC patients.
In this article, we pose a series of questions (Table 1) to assist
researchers in understanding how ethicists would analyze a
psilocybin trial involving DoC patients. We focus on Scott and
Carhart-Harris’s proposed research program, but the conceptual
frameworks we apply—the Value-Validity Framework (Binik
and Hey 2019) and Component Analysis (Weijer and Miller
2004)—are internationally accepted approaches for ethical
analysis and can be readily used to evaluate other research pro-
tocols in the science of consciousness (cf. Weijer et al. 2016).
Psychedelic Research in DoC
DoC are neurological conditions in which consciousness is glob-
ally impaired for an extended period of time (Peterson and
Bayne 2018). Following a period of coma due to traumatic or an-
oxic brain injury, a proportion of brain-injured patients may re-
cover, whereas others may enter into a vegetative state (VS),
minimally conscious state (MCS), or die (Jennett 2002). The VS is
characterized by wakeful unresponsiveness, consistent with re-
covery of the reticular activating system (Jennett and Plum
1972). VS patients will open their eyes spontaneously and have
semiregular sleep patterns but will display no evidence of
awareness of self or environment. MCS patients, in contrast,
show limited but discernable evidence of awareness, including
the capacities to follow commands, recognize and use objects,
respond appropriately to painful stimuli, or communicate
(Giacino et al. 2002). Patients who recover from an MCS with ag-
gressive rehabilitation may transition into an emergence from
minimally conscious state (EMCS; Nakase-Richardson et al.
2012). EMCS patients show improved communication and cog-
nitive function but are confused or lack situational orientation
(Nakase-Richardson et al. 2009). Patients who do not recover
may remain in a VS or MCS indefinitely, or they may die as a re-
sult of withdrawal of care or medical complications secondary
to their condition.
A precise mechanistic link between the loss of conscious-
ness and brain injury has not yet been formulated. However,
several hypotheses—including the mesocircuit hypothesis
(Schiff 2010) and global workspace theory (Dehaene et al. 2011—
could have clinical value. One promising area of research
involves the assessment of informational dynamics to deter-
mine whether a patient’s brain retains the capacity to integrate
information, and whether this integration is associated with
the modulation of consciousness. Casali et al. (2013) refined this
technique by devising a novel index that represents the degree
to which TMS perturbation can alter a large set of integrated
brain regions over time. EEG recordings of a “TMS echo” can be
expressed as a linear value, or perturbation complexity index
(PCI), which tracks the degree to which a patient’s brain integra-
tes information. High PCI values correlate with healthy, wakeful
consciousness, whereas low PCI values correlate with impaired
consciousness in clinically diagnosed VS and MCS patients.
This complexity-based metric could improve prognostication
and diagnostic accuracy in DoC patients who appear unrespon-
sive at the bedside.
The success of complexity-based metrics in discriminating
levels of consciousness in brain-injured patients has motivated
researchers to refine these indices (Sitt et al. 2014; Schartner
et al. 2015; Hudetz et al. 2016) as well as to identify interventions
that might therapeutically modulate brain complexity.
Controlled doses of psilocybin, as proposed by Scott and
Carhart-Harris (2019), might be one pharmacological interven-
tion that could increase brain complexity and potentially hasten
recovery in VS, MCS, and EMCS patients.
Psilocybin is a serotonin 2A receptor agonist. Serotonin 2A
receptor agonism, Scott and Carhart-Harris report, is
“associated with enhanced cognitive flexibility [and] cortical
neural plasticity” in animal models, whereas serotonin 2A recep-
tor antagonism “is associated with reduced cognitive flexibility
and slow-wave sleep” in humans (Zhang and Stackman 2015;
Table 1. Guiding ethical questions for conducting a psilocybin trial in DoC patients
Research ethics question Description
Does a psilocybin trial involving DoC
patients have clinical or social value?
Clinical value concerns whether a trial’s hypothesis is relevant to answering a pressing
clinical question. Social value concerns the relevance of a trial’s hypothesis in
addressing an important scientific or social problem.
Is the proposed psilocybin trial scientifically
valid?
A protocol is valid if the study design is appropriate to answer the research question.
The use of inappropriate or unreliable methods undermines the study’s potential to
produce knowledge of clinical or social value.
Is psilocybin administration a therapeutic
or nontherapeutic procedure?
Therapeutic procedures have an evidence base sufficient to justify the belief that they
may be of direct benefit to research participants. Nontherapeutic procedures are used
solely to answer a scientific question. Distinguishing therapeutic from nontherapeu-
tic procedures allows for an accurate risk-benefit analysis of a trial.
Does psilocybin administration in DoC
patients pose no more than a minor
increase over minimal risk?
A key protection for vulnerable participants is the limit set on the risks to which they
may permissibly be exposed for scientific purposes. This limit is universally recog-
nized as the minimal risk threshold. It is unethical to apply nontherapeutic proce-
dures in vulnerable participants that exceed this risk threshold.
Will research participants be selected
fairly?
Fair selection of research participants ensures that the benefits and burdens of research
participation are distributed equitably.
Will valid surrogate consent be sought for
research participation?
Surrogate consent for research is permissible. Safeguards should be put in place to pre-
vent therapeutic misconception or to address the possibility that a participant might
regain consent capacity during the trial.
Framework adapted from Binik and Hey (2019) and Weijer and Miller (2004).
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Carhart-Harris and Nutt 2017; Ly et al. 2018; Scott and Carhart-
Harris 2019, 3). These cognitive changes are notable as serotonin
2A receptors are densest in structures associated with the
default-mode network—an intrinsic cortical network associated
with consciousness—and are predominately expressed postsy-
naptically on pyramidal cells with dendrites that span, and po-
tentially integrate, all layers of the cortex. Preliminary
neuroimaging studies support a potential relationship between
psilocybin administration and increased brain complexity
(Schartner et al. 2017) and, as Scott and Carhart-Harris note,
“this finding has been replicated using a variety of complexity
measures and measurement tools” (Carhart-Harris 2018; Scott
and Carhart-Harris 2019, 3). These findings motivate Scott and
Carhart-Harris’s hypothesis: if clinically meaningful changes in
consciousness are closely associated with brain complexity,
and brain complexity might be improved with psilocybin, then
psilocybin might result in clinically meaningful improvements
in consciousness among VS, MCS, and EMCS patients.
In what follows, we critically analyze this proposal through
the lens of research ethics. We identify particular details in
Scott and Carhart-Harris’s proposal, charitably interrogate their
epistemic and ethical merit, and raise a number of practical
suggestions that might assist researchers who are interested in
proposing a psilocybin trial involving DoC patients.
Does a psilocybin trial involving DoC patients have
clinical or social value?
New drug trials expose participants to risk and are resource in-
tensive. These burdens may be justified, but only if the trial has
sufficient clinical or social value. The Value-Validity Framework
is a method for evaluating whether a trial’s burdens are justified
by determining whether the underlying research question has
clinical or social value (Binik and Hey 2019). Clinical value con-
cerns whether a trial’s research question is relevant to answering
a pressing clinical hypothesis, whereas social value concerns the
relevance of the research question in addressing an important
scientific or social problem. Ensuring that a trial’s research ques-
tion has value promotes public trust in the scientific enterprise.
The research question encapsulated by Scott and Carhart-
Harris’s proposal is whether psilocybin can modulate con-
sciousness and hasten recovery in DoC patients. This research
question has clinical value. Incidence of the VS in North
America and Europe is estimated to be between 5 and 25 per
million population (Beaumont and Kenealy 2005). Currently,
there are few pharmacological treatments for these patients.
Several drugs have been tested—Amantadine and Zolpidem are
among the most promising—but results are mixed, and
Amantadine has only just recently been recommended for clini-
cal practice in the US practice guideline update on DoC (Giacino
et al. 2018). In addition, the pharmacological mechanisms of
these drugs differ from that of psilocybin. Psilocybin would thus
be in a new category of agents, serotonin 2A receptor agonists,
that could hasten recovery following brain injury.
The proposed research question also has scientific and social
value. In the USA, 3.5 million traumatic brain injuries occur annu-
ally with a cost-burden of at least $76.5 billion (Maas et al. 2017).
The lifetime-care costs for DoC patients are further compounded
by the need for long-term care and access to multidisciplinary re-
habilitation (NIH Consensus Development Panel on
Rehabilitation of Persons With Traumatic Brain Injury 1999). In
addition, determining how the brain produces consciousness
remains one of the most important questions of modern science.
Psilocybin trials in healthy participants have already yielded
important information regarding brain complexity and changes
in states of consciousness. Application of psilocybin in DoC
patients could further advance this knowledge.
Researchers interested in conducting a psilocybin trial in-
volving DoC patients should emphasize the clinical and social
value of this research. This value explains, in part, why con-
ducting such a trial would be justified.
Is the proposed psilocybin trial scientifically valid?
A research protocol is scientifically valid if the trial design is ap-
propriate to answer the proposed research question (Binik and
Hey 2019). A protocol that lacks scientific validity would fail to
justify the burdens placed on research participants even if the
research question is socially or clinically valuable.
Scott and Carhart-Harris describe a research program involv-
ing healthy participant trials and adaptive trials for DoC
patients. This research program is distinct from a specific trial
design, so it is difficult to determine whether a psilocybin trial
involving DoC patients would be scientifically valid.
Nevertheless, one feature of their proposed research program
requires careful scrutiny.
Scott and Carhart-Harris suggest that improvements in con-
sciousness are closely associated with a participant’s brain
complexity. They represent brain complexity as a Lempel-Ziv
Complexity (LZC), which is an index of information
“compressibility” (Sitt et al. 2014; Scott and Carhart-Harris 2019,
3). An LZC value can be calculated from either resting-state EEG,
or from a PCI. “LZC-based values of spontaneous EEG,” Scott
and Carhart-Harris observe, “reliably discriminate vegetative
state from minimally conscious state patients and values in-
crease monotonically with patients’ conscious level” (Scott and
Carhart-Harris 2019, 3).
Scott and Carhart-Harris describe that the end-point mea-
sure of improvements in consciousness following psilocybin ad-
ministration would be an LZC value. They note further that
clinically validated neurobehavioral scales (e.g. the JFK-Coma
Recovery Scale-Revised or the Wessex Head Injury Matrix)
would be incorporated, where feasible (Scott and Carhart-Harris
2019, 6). But why should we believe that an LZC value will pre-
dict recovery absent of verification from clinically validated
scales? Scott and Carhart-Harris review compelling evidence of
the power of LZC values in discriminating conscious from un-
conscious DoC patients. Yet, to our knowledge, an LZC value is
not a clinically-validated index for classifying DoC patients. The
validity of a psilocybin trial would thus hang on the strength of
associations between an LZC value and a clinical diagnosis.
This feature of the trial design could be challenged. An LZC
value might be used in phase II trials, but more pragmatic eval-
uations of clinical outcomes would be needed in later trials.
Complexity-based metrics used to assess improvements in
consciousness might also be complicated by evidence showing
that brain complexity can increase, rather than decrease, when
a participant is unconscious. Schartner et al. (2017) recently
demonstrated that subanesthetic doses of ketamine are associ-
ated with increases in LZC values. Yet, in contrast, an increase
in PCI values has also been elicited in participants with anes-
thetic doses of ketamine, which render participants entirely
unresponsive (Sarasso et al. 2015). To be sure, PCI values and
LZC values represent different cortical functions associated
with complexity. This might explain these opposite trends dur-
ing ketamine induction. Nevertheless, different neurobiological
mechanisms underlying the loss of consciousness in healthy
participants (e.g. dissociation vs. increased inhibition) can yield
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opposite results with complexity-based metrics. This raises the
question as to whether a reliable baseline complexity-based
metric can even be established to assess the effect of a drug.
We suggest that researchers interested in conducting a psi-
locybin trial involving DoC patients consider assessing partici-
pants with neurobehavioral scales as a complementary
extension of complexity-based metrics. Researchers might be-
gin a trial with LZC values as end-point measures, but more
pragmatic, longitudinal assessment will likely be required as
proof of the drug’s efficacy as the research program matures.
Is psilocybin administration a therapeutic or
nontherapeutic procedure?
Once it is established that a trial is valuable and scientifically
valid, researchers may proceed to a risk-benefit analysis of the
trial’s procedures. Component analysis is an internationally ac-
cepted approach for judging the proportionality of a trial’s risks
and benefits (Weijer and Miller 2004). This method systemati-
cally disambiguates the risks associated with different trial pro-
cedures and identifies areas where safeguards could mitigate
risk, consistent with valid scientific design.
Component analysis begins by asking which trial procedures
are therapeutic and which are nontherapeutic. Therapeutic proce-
dures are interventions that have an evidence base sufficient to
justify the belief that they may be of direct benefit to research par-
ticipants, whereas nontherapeutic procedures are used to solely
answer a scientific question (Weijer and Miller 2004, 570).
Distinguishing therapeutic from nontherapeutic procedures allows
researchers to analyze their risks and benefits independently.
In the translational trajectory of drug development, a pharma-
cological intervention will predictably transition from a nonther-
apeutic procedure to a therapeutic procedure as its evidence base
matures. Several trials must be conducted—in both healthy and
clinical populations—before there is an evidence base sufficient
to justify the drug’s therapeutic benefit. We think that, early in its
translational trajectory, psilocybin should be regarded as a non-
therapeutic procedure for DoC patients. Scott and Carhart-Harris
outline several important studies that demonstrate the effect of
psilocybin on brain complexity (Schartner et al. 2017), and the re-
lationship between brain complexity and consciousness (Wu
et al. 2011; Casali et al. 2013; Sitt et al. 2014). But these studies do
not make a direct connection between the administration of psi-
locybin and clinically valuable improvements in consciousness.
The hypothesis that psilocybin might hasten recovery in DoC
patients is thus contingent on a particular background theory re-
garding the relationship between brain complexity and con-
sciousness (Tononi et al. 1994).
To be sure, Scott and Carhartt-Harris acknowledge that brain
complexity need not “be the cause of conscious awareness,” only
that it is an “explanatory correlate of the neural processes inti-
mately related to conscious awareness” for their hypothesis to be
plausible (Scott and Carhart-Harris 2019, 3). Nevertheless, other
competing theories of the neural mechanisms that are correlated
with consciousness in DoC patients—the mesocircuit hypothesis
and the global workspace theory—might also have clinical value
(Schiff 2010; Dehaene et al. 2011). This tension among underlying
theories tempers the idea that, without further evidence, psilocy-
bin ought to be regarded as a therapeutic procedure.
Notwithstanding these theoretical concerns, the experimen-
tal evidence presented to justify psilocybin’s therapeutic benefit
might also be called into question. Scott and Carhart-Harris ref-
erence two historical studies involving the administration of
another serotonin 2A agonist (Lysergic acid diethylamide or
LSD) while healthy participants were in non-REM sleep (Muzio
et al. 1966; Torda 1968). Administration of LSD induced transient
episodes of rapid-eye movement, which likely represented an
improvement in consciousness. These studies are relevant for
understanding the potential association between serotonin 2A
agonists and consciousness. However, even if these studies
were adequately replicated, it is unclear why changes in con-
sciousness in healthy participants during non-REM sleep should
be regarded as an experimental proxy for DoC patients. The
mechanisms that underly changes in consciousness during
sleep in healthy participants are likely radically different than
those affected by severe brain injury.
In addition, to our knowledge, psilocybin has only just re-
ceived “Breakthrough Therapy” designation from the U.S. Food




sion/). “Breakthrough Therapy” designation is an important
step in advancing clinical research involving psilocybin, but
such a designation is not transferable between clinical popula-
tions. The fact that there is promising—albeit preliminary—evi-
dence of safety and tolerability of psilocybin in a psychiatric
population does not itself warrant research involving DoC
patients. Unlike psychiatric patients, DoC patients often sustain
multiple injuries, are chronically or critically ill, and might be
on other medications that could interact adversely with psilocy-
bin. Moreover, to our knowledge, psilocybin has not been ap-
proved for any clinical use. This sets psilocybin apart from
other pharmacological interventions in DoC patients, which
have already been approved for other clinical applications.
Scott and Carhart-Harris propose conducting several experi-
ments in healthy participants before implementing psilocybin in
DoC patients. We commend Scott and Carhart-Harris for focusing
first on studies involving healthy participants, as results from
these studies could support claims regarding the drug’s therapeu-
tic benefit. However, in demonstrating the potential therapeutic
benefit of psilocybin, we suggest that researchers carefully iden-
tify similarities and differences between control conditions (e.g.
healthy participants in non-REM sleep or under sedation) and the
neurological dysfunction characteristic of DoC patients. The
mechanisms underlying the loss of consciousness in the former
are likely to be distinct from those affected in the latter.
Does psilocybin administration pose no more than a
minor increase over minimal risk?
Once a trial’s procedures have been identified as either thera-
peutic or nontherapeutic, researchers can evaluate their respec-
tive risks and benefits. One approach to evaluating risks and
benefits—as Scott and Carhartt-Harris suggest (Scott and
Carhart-Harris 2019, 4)—is to determine whether the total mag-
nitude of the potential benefits is proportionate to the potential
risks. Thus, in this case, it might be reasoned that the potential
benefits of psilocybin to DoC patients, who may have no other
therapeutic options, clearly outweigh any potential risks; DoC
patients have nothing to lose and everything to gain.
We think that this approach is wrong for two reasons. First, fo-
cusing narrowly on risk-benefit proportionality ignores the poten-
tial vulnerability of research participants. Vulnerable participants
are defined as those individuals who are at an increased likelihood
of being wronged (Hurst 2008). Vulnerable participants might be
unable to provide consent, be subject to coercion, or be members
of a marginalized community. Examples of vulnerable
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participants include children, prisoners, pregnant individuals, and
people with cognitive disabilities. Ignoring the vulnerability of re-
search participants can result in the attitude that some individu-
als are beyond harm or, in the extreme case, that they lack moral
standing. We think this attitude should be resisted. The very fact
that we regard DoC patients as individuals who have the potential
to recover, rather than mere corpses, suggests that they do have
moral standing and that the harms of research participation
should be taken seriously (Peterson et al. 2019). Moreover, a vul-
nerable participant, precisely in virtue of her vulnerability, has far
more to lose than a healthy individual if things go wrong during
the research intervention.
Second, the presumption that risk-benefit proportionality is
sufficient to justify research participation is inconsistent with
national and international policies on research involving vul-
nerable participants (COIMS 2016). A key protection for vulnera-
ble participants is the limit set on the risks to which they may
permissibly be exposed for scientific purposes. The Declaration
of Helsinki, which has been continually endorsed by the World
Medical Association since its drafting in 1964, explicitly states
that vulnerable participants “must not be included in a research
study that has no likelihood of benefit for them unless [. . .] the
research entails only minimal risk and minimal burden” (WMA
2013, Paragraph 28). DoC patients are vulnerable participants.
They are, therefore, entitled to this minimal risk protection.
A standard interpretation of minimal risk is that it is the risk
encountered in daily life; however, there is considerable debate
in the literature regarding whose daily life this should be: a
healthy individual or a clinical participant? The relevant issue
for researchers proposing a psilocybin trial involving DoC
patients is to consider whether the risk of psilocybin adminis-
tration would exceed this threshold in either case.
To address this, Scott and Carhart-Harris describe a phase II
psilocybin trial involving patients with treatment-resistant de-
pression (Carhart-Harris et al. 2016; Carhart-Harris et al. 2018).
They observe that, in this trial, “administration of oral psilocy-
bin was well-tolerated [. . .], with the most common adverse
events being mild transient anxiety just prior to as well as dur-
ing drug onset” (Scott and Carhart-Harris 2019, 5). They also
note that psilocybin has the potential to induce a transient un-
pleasant state of deep anxiety (or “bad trip”), although the fre-
quency of this adverse psychological event is difficult to
estimate.
To mitigate these risks, Scott and Carhart-Harris propose an
adaptive trial design with dose escalation, beginning at very
small dosages. They also propose adopting procedures from
psychiatric trials, including drug administration in a familiar
environment and ensuring that people who can provide psy-
chological support are present (Scott and Carhart-Harris 2019,
5). These procedures are consistent with previous safety guide-
lines for human psychedelic research (Johnson et al. 2008).
We think that a more careful analysis of the potential risks
of psilocybin administration in DoC patients is needed. We
agree with Scott and Carhart-Harris that assumptions about the
long-term negative psychological effects of psilocybin are
largely unfounded (cf. Krebs and Johansen 2013; Johansen and
Krebs 2015). Nevertheless, the possibility that adverse psycho-
logical events could result from a nontherapeutic procedure in a
vulnerable population is cause for concern.
First, the risk mitigation procedures borrowed from trials in
psychiatric populations might be insufficient for the variation
and complexity of risk profiles in DoC patients. Risk mitigation
in DoC patients presents a puzzle: different categories of DoC
patients—VS, MCS, and EMCS—have variations in preserved
cognitive function that may, or may not, leave them susceptible
to risks at the beginning of a trial. However, if psilocybin is suc-
cessful, this may change a participant’s risk profile as the trial
progresses. VS patients are not conscious and thus—at least,
initially—would not be at risk of adverse psychological events,
whereas EMCS patients are conscious and may be susceptible to
pre-administration- or drug-onset-anxiety. Yet, if psilocybin
was effective in a VS patient, this would change her risk profile;
she would become susceptible to risks that she would not other-
wise be subject to if she were unconscious. This raises complex
questions regarding the probability of adverse psychological
events, as the probability appears to be linked to, and changes
with, the effectiveness of the drug and a participant’s diagnosis
at enrollment. Ongoing risk assessment and mitigation that
tracks the modulation of consciousness throughout a trial
might be one way to resolve this problem.
Second, adverse psychological events might be compounded
by the cognitive changes that occur when patients emerge from
unconsciousness. The posttraumatic confusional state is a well-
documented clinical phenomenon that occurs in EMCS patients.
Posttraumatic confusion is characterized by sleep disturbances,
psychotic episodes, and delirium (Sherer et al. 2005, 2014). This
state is not itself a risk of research participation. The condition
can be medically managed and, generally speaking, it is an indi-
cator of a positive outcome of an intervention intended to has-
ten recovery. Nevertheless, the fact that posttraumatic
confusion could be exacerbated by an adverse psychological
event associated with psilocybin is cause for concern. A brain-
injured patient might experience a “nightmarish” awakening
rather than a smooth transition into consciousness.
Administration of psilocybin in a familiar environment and pro-
viding psychological support could mitigate this risk, but these
procedures might also be insufficient to address this unique
clinical phenomenon.
Third, the fact that some DoC patients might be unable to com-
municate whether they are experiencing an adverse psychological
event suggests that researchers are unlikely to know if such
events are occurring. If psilocybin interacts with another medica-
tion causing the participant to become hypotensive, this could
readily be detected with clinical monitoring equipment. Yet the
detection of an adverse psychological event in DoC patients is not
straightforward. VS patients cannot communicate, whereas MCS
patients may or may not have preserved functional communica-
tion. Meanwhile, EMCS patients can communicate, but the range
of their verbal repertoire is often limited to “yes” or “no” responses
and they could lack situational awareness (Nakase-Richardson
et al. 2009). These limitations could prevent DoC patients from im-
mediately communicating their anxiety or efforts to seek psycho-
logical support. Proxy measures of anxiety, such as heart rate,
perspiration, or respiration monitoring, combined with the pro-
posed adaptive trial design could mitigate this risk, but only to the
extent that researchers can reasonably know when things are go-
ing badly. Not knowing that a participant is experiencing an ad-
verse psychological event makes this risk worse.
Finally, concerns could be raised about the use of TMS while
DoC patients are under the influence of psilocybin. Magnetic
perturbation of the cortex during increased cortical excitability
of pyramidal cells could lead to unknown risks. These risks
could also be compounded by changes in seizure thresholds fol-
lowing brain injury. This, again, points to complications in rely-
ing on a complexity-based metric as the sole end-point
measure of a psilocybin trial. Deriving an LZC value from
resting-state EEG, rather than a PCI, is likely the safest option
for this clinical population.
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Scott and Carhart-Harris defend the ethical legitimacy of their
proposed trial by comparing psilocybin to other investigational
interventions used in DoC patients. They note that “the invasive
surgical implantation of Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) electrodes
has been carried out for 50years, despite a lack of consistent evi-
dence of benefits for improving conscious awareness” (Scott and
Carhart-Harris 2019, 5). If such procedures were deemed ethical in
the past, they reason, then surely psilocybin should be too.
This is a bad argument, for it assumes that the investiga-
tional implantation of DBS electrodes in DoC patients is, in fact,
ethical. To be convincing, Scott and Carhart-Harris need to ar-
gue that DBS is ethical before comparing it to psilocybin admin-
istration. This concern notwithstanding, we think that
discussion of DBS should not be a central consideration for jus-
tifying a psilocybin trial involving DoC patients. Ethics commit-
tees might appeal to past precedent when evaluating a novel
trial, but past precedent alone is insufficient to justify a current
trial’s ethical permissibility.
If researchers are interested in proposing a psilocybin trial
involving DoC patients, they should clearly demonstrate how
administration poses no more than a minor increase over mini-
mal risk, and how the proposed risk mitigation procedures are
commensurate with the unique challenges posed by this clini-
cal population. For example, a risk management protocol for
psilocybin-induced anxiety could help researchers address
these challenges as they arise. The protocol might specify when
researchers should block the acute influence of psilocybin with
a 2A receptor antagonist, reduce anxiety with pharmacological
sedation, or use a combination of both.
Will research participants be selected fairly?
The ethical principle of justice requires that research participants
be selected fairly. Fair selection ensures that the benefits and bur-
dens of research participation are distributed equitably (National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical
and Behavioral Research 1979; WMA 2013; COIMS 2016).
A long-standing heuristic in research ethics is that recruit-
ment of research participants should proceed from the least
vulnerable to the most vulnerable, provided that the research
can be carried out equally as well in either population (cf.
COIMS 2002, Guideline 13). Application of this heuristic in a pro-
posed psilocybin trial bears on the question of scientific validity.
Who should be recruited for a psilocybin trial to ensure scien-
tific validity and satisfaction of the principle of justice? Should
researchers transition directly from healthy participant trials to
studies involving noncommunicative DoC patients? Or should
there be intermediary steps in participant selection?
Scott and Carhart-Harris state that the initial “patient inclu-
sion criteria and recruitment protocol would be similar to previ-
ous early-phase pharmacology studies in [DoC patients]” (Scott
and Carhart-Harris 2019, 5). What do these inclusion criteria
look like? One early-phase trial of Amantadine recruited DoC
patients 4–16 weeks after traumatic brain injury (Giacino et al.
2012). This ensured that participants were medically stable, but
still early enough in their recovery that pharmacological inter-
vention might yield measurable results. In addition, previous
pharmacological trials have either excluded patients with non-
traumatic etiologies (Giacino et al. 2012) or used mixed samples
of traumatic and nontraumatic patients (Thonnard et al. 2013).
Early recruitment of DoC patients raises several questions.
Such patients might still be comatose, and may be receiving
other treatments that compete with psilocybin. For example,
ketanserin, which is used as either an anti-hypertensive or to
reduce shivering in the operating room, might be indicated af-
ter severe brain injury (Leslie and Sessler 2003). But this drug is
also a 2A receptor antagonist and is known to block the effects
of psilocybin. Would a trial require that patients forgo this
medication? If so, would this be justified? Further, if some
patients are recruited early in recovery, they might still be hos-
pitalized in an intensive care unit. Research involving patients
in intensive care is ethically complicated (Truog 2005).
Participation in a trial could impede the individualized care
that DoC patients need in the early stages of recovery. This
would be difficult to justify if the trial’s procedures are
nontherapeutic.
We think that a plausible approach to recruitment is to begin
with healthy participants and then progress to clinical popula-
tions with incrementally worse cognitive impairment. This
would allow researchers to determine safety, tolerability, and
dosing in healthy and medically stable clinical participants who
can communicate (e.g. EMCS patients) prior to application in
noncommunicative patients (e.g. VS or comatose patients). Not
only would this allow for accurate identification of adverse psy-
chological events, but it would also ensure that the most vulner-
able brain-injured patients are not disproportionately burdened
by research participation.
Will valid surrogate consent be sought for research
participation?
The ethical principle of respect for persons requires that
researchers seek the consent of participants for research partic-
ipation (National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979; WMA
2013; COIMS 2016).
Some research participants lack the capacity to consent (e.g.
people with cognitive disabilities or children). However, clinical
research in these populations could be valuable and most juris-
dictions agree that surrogate consent for research is authorized.
DoC patients require surrogate consent for research partici-
pation. There are several ethical issues that researchers
should be sensitive to when seeking surrogate consent. First,
the surrogates of DoC patients—usually next of kin—might
misunderstand the research or overestimate the therapeutic
value of the intervention. Safeguards should be put in place to
ensure that this misunderstanding does not occur (Bruni et al.
2019). Researchers should first clear the consent procedure
with the clinical team. The clinical team will have the stron-
gest sense of a family’s attitudes toward research participa-
tion. In addition, consent should be sought in a private space
where the surrogate can adequately process the risks of psilo-
cybin administration. The consent form should be short, be
written at a level that can be understood by the surrogate, and
be explicit as to whether psilocybin administration is a thera-
peutic or nontherapeutic procedure (Nishimura et al. 2013).
These safeguards will help surrogates understand the re-
search protocol and current knowledge regarding the thera-
peutic benefit of the drug.
In addition, it is also plausible that, if psilocybin is effective
at hastening recovery, some participants may regain the capac-
ity to voice their preferences regarding continued participation
in the trial. Researchers should prepare for this by incorporating
ongoing evaluation of decision-making capacity in the trial.
This could involve a modified capacity assessment for people
with communication impairments (Cairncross et al. 2016), or an
assent-dissent model similar to that used in research involving
children (Levy et al. 2003).










This article provided an ethical analysis of psychedelic research
involving DoC patients. We focused on Scott and Carhart-
Harris’s proposal, but the ethical frameworks described are ap-
plicable to other research protocols in the science of conscious-
ness. We encourage researchers to use these frameworks when
proposing new studies involving DoC patients. The frameworks
support the overall strength of the scientific enterprise and as-
sure ethics committees that researchers are taking the protec-
tion of vulnerable participants seriously.
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